Public Debt and Social Expenditure: Friends or Foes? by Eduardo Lora & Mauricio Olivera
 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) 
Research Department  
Departamento de Investigación 








Public Debt and Social Expenditure: 














*Inter-American Development Bank 









   2
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the  
Inter-American Development Bank  
Felipe Herrera Library 
 
 
    
Lora, Eduardo. 
 
Public debt and social expenditure : friends or foes? / by Eduardo Lora, Mauricio Olivera. 
p. cm.  
(Research Department working paper series ; 563)   
Includes bibliographical references. 
 
1. Debts, External.   2. Debts, Public.   3. Expenditures, Public.    I. Olivera, Mauricio.    
II. Inter-American Development Bank. Research  Dept.   III. Title.   IV. Series. 
 











Inter-American Development Bank 
1300 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20577 
 
The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be 
attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. 
 
This paper may be freely reproduced provided credit is given to the Research Department, Inter-
American Development Bank. 
 
The Research Department (RES) produces a quarterly newsletter, IDEA (Ideas for Development 
in the Americas), as well as working papers and books on diverse economic issues. To obtain a 
complete list of RES publications, and read or download them please visit our web site at: 
http://www.iadb.org/res. 




This paper assesses the effects of total public debt (external and domestic) on 
social expenditure worldwide and in Latin America using an unbalanced panel of 
around 50 countries for the period 1985-2003. The most robust and important 
finding is that higher debt ratios do reduce social expenditures, as popular opinion 
holds. This effect comes mostly from the stock of debt and not from debt service 
payments, indicating that debt displaces social expenditures not so much because 
it raises the debt burden, but because it reduces the room (or the appetite) for 
further indebtedness. Loans from multilateral organizations like the World Bank 
or the Inter-American Development Bank do not seem to ameliorate the adverse 
consequences of debt on social expenditures. In accordance with popular wisdom, 
our results indicate that defaulting on debt obligations does help to increase social 
expenditures. Nonetheless, Latin America is different in some respects. The 
adverse effects of debt and debt-interest payments are significantly stronger in the 
region, which makes defaults more beneficial to social expenditures. While many 
of these conclusions are very heterodox, their main policy implication is not; there 
is no better way to protect social expenditures than to avoid overindebtedness, 
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1. Introduction 
 
The conflict between honoring public debt commitments and alleviating the lot of the poor is a 
recurrent topic among social policy activists and left-wing politicians in the developing world. 
For instance, at the World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre in 2002, participants observed that 
external debt payments absorb a substantial amount of resources and that poor developing 
countries should stop repaying their debt. Funds previously earmarked for debt repayment should 
be redirected to finance “socially just and ecologically sustainable development” (Toussaint and 
Zacharie, 2002). Debt relief, either granted by the lenders or obtained unilaterally through 
outright default, is often seen as an expeditious way to raise social public expenditure and 
improve the welfare of the poor. As argued by the World Bank and the IMF in support of the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, debt “relief can also be used to free up 
resources for higher social spending aimed at poverty reduction to the extent that cash debt-
service payments are reduced.”
2 Jeffrey Sachs has gone even further: “No civilized country 
should try to collect the debts of people that are dying of hunger and disease and poverty.”
3 
These arguments resonate strongly in Latin America, where interest debt payments absorb on 
average 2.8 percent of GDP, which would be enough to increase total social expenditures by 25 
percent.
4 
Considering the attention that this issue attracts in the public debate, it is striking how 
little empirical research has been devoted to assessing whether countries burdened with heavier 
debt commitments do indeed spend less in the social sectors. A few studies have been concerned 
with the factors that may influence social expenditure levels, and more specifically, the possible 
impact of fiscal adjustment measures on social expenditure. For instance, Hicks and Kubisch 
(1984) and Hicks (1989) found that social expenditures tended to be well-protected in a small 
sample of highly indebted countries during periods of fiscal retrenchment in the 1970s and early 
1980s, a finding that is confirmed by Baqir (2002) with a panel of over 100 countries for the 
period 1985-1998.  
Another topic of study has been the influence of institutional and political variables in 
social expenditure, which is the focus of the paper by Baqir. His main conclusion is that 
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democratization tends to be followed by important increases in social expenditure, a stylized fact 
that reflects the Latin American experience, where the wave of democratizations that took place 
in the 1980s was followed by an important increase in social expenditures, from a median of 7.7 
percent of GDP in 1990 to 11.4 percent in 2003.
5 Other authors who have explored how public 
expenditures may be affected by institutional and political variables have concluded that 
corruption reduces the share of education expenditures in total expenditures (Mauro, 1998) and 
that education and health expenditures grow faster in more democratic countries (Snyder and 
Yackovlev, 2000). 
In a related branch of the literature, several studies have analyzed how the economic or 
the functional categories of public spending may be affected when total expenditure is reduced. 
For instance, Heller and Diamond (1990) found that the most common shift in spending patterns 
among a large number of developing countries during the 1975-86 period was away from fixed 
assets and capital transfers and toward interest, subsidy and transfer payments. Using a sample of 
25 countries from 1972 to 1988, Papagitos (1992) concluded that stabilization programs do not 
shift public expenditure away from “growth-augmenting areas,” a concept that includes 
education and health expenditures. 
Nonetheless, while fiscal adjustment or public expenditure reductions may be aimed at 
honoring debt obligations, these studies do not shed enough light on the impact that debt and 
debt service payments may have on the level of social expenditures or their share in total 
expenditures. Mahdavi (2004) is the only author who has attempted to assess how the external 
debt burden may influence the composition of government spending by economic categories. 
Using a sample of 47 countries for 1972-2001, Mahdavi finds support for the adverse effect of 
the debt burden on capital expenditure, and on current expenditures other than wages and 
salaries. Since a large part of social expenditure takes place in the form of wages and salaries 
paid to public servants in the education and health public sectors, this finding may suggest that 
social expenditures are shielded from the adverse effects of the debt burden. This would be 
consistent with previous findings on the resilience of this type of expenditures to fiscal 
adjustment measures.  
However, this implication is not warranted, not only because the non-wage components 
of expenditure are important in some social sectors (health prevention and social protection 
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programs, for instance), but also because external debt is only a fraction of public debt: on 
average in Latin America, 22 percent of total public debt is held domestically, but in some 
countries that share is much higher and has been increasing recently.  
Finally, a recent paper by Chauvin and Kraay (2005) has assessed the effects of debt 
relief on several economic and social variables, including public social expenditures. Using their 
own database measuring the present value of debt relief for 62 low-income countries between 
1989 and 2003, they “find little evidence that debt relief has affected the level and composition 
of public spending in recipient countries.” 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effects of total public debt (external and 
domestic) on social expenditure worldwide and in Latin America. More specifically, this paper 
addresses the following questions: 
•  Are social expenditures (as a share of GDP and as a share of total public expenditure) 
affected by changes in public debt ratios (over GDP), and in what direction? 
•  Is this effect due solely to the changes that occur in public debt service payments (as a 
share of GDP) when debt changes, or does the stock of debt have an effect of its own? 
•  Do different types of social expenditures (and more specifically, education and health 
expenditures) behave in the same way in response to changes in debt ratios or debt 
service payments? 
•  Does it make any difference if the lender is a multilateral organization, such as the 
International Monetary Fund, or a multilateral development bank?  
•  Does a debt default lead to an increase or a reduction in social expenditures? 
•  Do the answers to the previous questions hold for Latin America, or is the region 
different in any respect? 
•  And, finally, what are the policy implications of all of the above? 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to address these questions for a panel of 
countries. Our findings are striking. First and foremost, higher debt ratios do reduce social 
expenditures, as popular opinion holds. The largest and most robust part of this effect takes place 
directly from the stock of debt to social expenditures, which are more affected than other 
expenditures when debt increases. Surprisingly, increases in debt service payments (which may 
be the result of higher debt ratios) produce only a minor and non-significant effect on social   7
expenditures. This clearly suggests that debt displaces social expenditures not so much because it 
raises the debt burden, but because it reduces the room (or the appetite) for further indebtedness. 
Worldwide, both education and health expenditures are hit when debt increases but, proportional 
to the size of the expenditures, the impact is larger on health. Loans from official sources in 
general, and from the multilateral organizations in particular, do not seem to ameliorate the 
adverse consequences of debt on social expenditures. In accordance with popular wisdom, our 
results indicate that defaulting on debt obligations does help increase social expenditures 
(although our default measures may be somewhat imprecise). Finally, Latin America does seem 
to be different in several respects. The adverse effects of debt are significantly stronger in Latin 
America, especially in the health sectors. Social expenditures are also much more vulnerable in 
Latin America to increases in debt interest payments, which makes defaults more beneficial to 
social expenditures.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the database and the 
econometric strategy. Section 3 discusses the main results worldwide before making any 
distinction between types of social expenditures or lender. These nuances are introduced in 
Section 4, where the possible effect of defaults is also addressed. Section 5 focuses on Latin 
America. Section 6 summarizes the results and offers some policy implications. 
2. Data and Econometric Strategy 
We use an unbalanced panel of up to 58 developing countries for the period 1985-2003 (in most 
regressions the sample is restricted to around 50 countries due to missing data for some of the 
explanatory variables, or to the breakup of social expenditures between education, health and 
other). The information for social government expenditures comes from a data set compiled by 
the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF.
6 As explained by Baqir (2002), this data set is more 
reliable than the better-known Government Financial Statistics (GFS) database, because it is 
taken directly from IMF country documents produced in association with IMF program activities 
in each country. The country data vary as to whether they refer to central or general government 
figures, but the level of coverage over time for each country does not change. Government 
expenditures are scaled by GDP or by total primary expenditures (that is, all expenditures except 
interest payments) using data from the IMF’s International Finance Statistics (IFS) and GFS, 
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respectively. Section 5 also makes use of an alternative data source for social expenditures in 
Latin America, compiled by ECLAC with information provided directly by the governments and 
processed by ECLAC using standardized definitions of social expenditure. As will be shown 
there, the two data sets are very similar (for the countries covered by both).  
Data for debt stocks, our main explanatory variable, has been processed by the Research 
Department of the Inter-American Bank in the process of preparing the 2007 Economic and 
Social Progress report, which will de devoted to sovereign and external debt issues. This dataset 
uses information from the IMF’s International Finance Statistics (IFS), complemented with data 
from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and ECLAC.
7 One important feature of the data for 
debt stocks is that they cover both external and domestic debt issued by central governments (but 
not by other levels of government, or by state-owned enterprises). Debt data are expressed as 
shares of GDP in nominal values (to do that, debts denominated in foreign currencies are 
converted in domestic currency values using market exchange rates). To avoid the results being 
driven by outliers, or by major measurement errors, we restrict our sample to countries/years 
where debt is not larger than 150 percent of GDP.  
Interest debt payments and other fiscal variables come from the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics. Since all these data come in nominal values, they are converted into GDP 
ratios using the nominal GDP values reported by the IMF’s IFS. This is also the source for other 
macroeconomic variables, such as the exchange rate and the inflation rate. Finally the default 
variable (a dummy taking the value of 1 in the years that the country is in arrears) comes from 
Standard & Poor’s data processed by Borensztein and Panizza (2006). 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the econometric 
analysis and Table 2 reports pairwise correlations.  
The main concern that needs to be addressed in the estimation method is the endogeneity 
bias that would result from regressing social expenditures directly on public debt (and other 
fiscal variables). The most convenient method for dealing with endogeneity problems in panel 
data is the Arellano and Bond estimator, which uses lagged values of the explanatory variables 
(in first differences) as instruments for those same variables. The validity of the method rests on 
the assumption that the instruments are correlated with the explanatory variables but not with the 
dependent variable. The Sargan test (which is reported below in the main regressions) provides a 
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rough and ready test of the validity of the assumption. In a vast majority of our regressions, the 
Sargan test suggests no reason to suspect the validity of the method. However, in the first set of 
regressions, we also present standard ordinary least squared estimates that, although necessarily 
biased, point towards the same basic results as the Arellano and Bond estimator. Since the 
dependent variable is also converted into first differences, the Arellano and Bond estimator also 
deals with the non-stationarity problem that arises when the variables exhibit time trends that 
may lead to spurious correlations between the dependent and the explanatory variables. The 
Arellano and Bond estimator may still be inadequate when the series exhibit non-stationarity 
after first differentiation, a problem that may be present in some of our estimates as the z-test 
indicates (also reported in the first set of results, but which is corrected after the introduction of 
an additional lag of the dependent variable.  
3. Worldwide Results 
Table 3 presents the first set of results. In the first four columns, changes in social expenditures 
as a share of GDP are regressed on lagged changes in debt-to-GDP ratios, and on other controls 
(all the regressions control for the lagged dependent variable, changes in the log of GDP per 
capita and changes in the log squared of GDP per capita). According to these estimates, an 
increase of one percentage point in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a decline of 0.0132-
0.0155 percentage points in social expenditures as a share of GDP the following year (or a 
decline of 0.0191-0.0247 percentage points in the long run).
8 The coefficient is significant at 1 
percent and barely changes when the contemporary influence of other fiscal variables is 
controlled for, implying that the indirect effects of debt through these variables are of second 
order. However, some fiscal flow variables also directly affect social expenditures. A reduction 
in the overall or the primary fiscal deficit by $1 is associated with an average decline in social 
expenditures of around 3 cents in the current year (or nearly 5.5 cents in the long run). We stress 
the average, because the effect may vary widely depending on how that fiscal adjustment is 
achieved. As the coefficients of Regression 4 indicate, if primary expenditures are cut by $1, the 
contemporary decline in social expenditures may be as high as 13 cents, while if the same 
adjustment is achieved by raising more revenues, social expenditures may increase by 4 cents 
contemporaneously. Interestingly, interest debt payments do not have any (additional) effect on 
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social expenditures. Regressions 5 and 6 separate the effect of public debt between foreign and 
domestic. Both are negative and statistically similar, although only the effect of foreign debt is 
significant.  
The main results are robust to changes in the method of estimation as shown in Table 4. 
Regressions 1 and 2 show that for fixed-effects OLS, the contemporary effect of debt stock 
changes on social expenditure is basically the same as obtained with the Arellano and Bond 
estimator. Taking the coefficients for the lagged dependent variable at face value, the long-run 
effect of debt would be substantially lower, but that is probably the result of biases in the 
estimation of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (which takes negative values). 
Since the z-test in some of our basic regressions in Table 3 indicate the presence of 
autocorrelation of the residuals, in Regressions 3 and 4 of Table 4 we add to the list of regressors 
the second lag of the dependent variable, which produces only minor changes in the coefficients.
9   
The last two columns of Table 4 apply the Arellano and Bond estimator again, but define 
social expenditures not as shares of GDP, but as shares of total primary expenditures. The main 
result holds, namely, that social expenditures decline when the stock of debt has increased the 
previous year. The coefficients indicate that the share of social expenditures in total government 
expenditures declines 0.039–0.054 percentage points for each 1 percent increase in the debt ratio 
(with long-run effects about twice as large). However, the effects of the current flow variables 
are substantially different, implying that social and other public expenditures behave in different 
ways. When total primary expenditures decline by 1 percent of GDP, the share of social 
expenditures in primary expenditures increases nearly 0.4 percentage points, a finding consistent 
with previous literature showing that social expenditures are resilient to fiscal adjustments.
10  
At this point, a short detour will shed some light on how the main fiscal variables react to 
changes in the stock of debt. Table 5 indicates that an increase of $1 in the stock of debt is 
associated with an increase of 4.9 cents in the primary balance and 1.3 cents in interest debt 
payments the following year (or 7 cents and 3.7 cents in the long run). The net effect on the 
overall fiscal balance is an increase of 2 cents in the short run or 3 cents in the long run (but 
these values are not statistically significant). The typical response that produces the improvement 
of the primary balance is a mix of higher revenues (2.6 cents in the following year or 3 cents in 
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the long run) and lower expenditures (2.5 cents or 4.4 cents), but neither of them is estimated 
with precision.  
In summary, and putting all the pieces together, following an increase in the stock of 
debt, governments worldwide typically react by reducing total expenditures and increasing total 
revenues by an amount beyond the increase in interest debt payments, thus in general tightening 
somewhat the overall fiscal balance. In this process, social expenditures are hit 
disproportionately hard, as they are sensitive not only to changes in total expenditures (and 
somewhat less to changes in revenues), but also to the direct impact of the stock of debt. 
Previous literature has established that social expenditures are relatively more resilient than other 
expenditures during periods of fiscal retrenchment. Although our results do not contradict this 
conclusion in general, they do indicate that social expenditures are more directly sensitive to 
changes in the stocks of debt.  
Although the reasons for the higher sensitivity of social expenditures to changes in the 
stock of debt should be a matter of further research, two hypotheses may be advanced. The first 
has to do with the short-run return of the non-wage component of social expenditures vis-à-vis 
other discretionary spending in the budget. It has been stressed that since the wage bill is an 
important component of social expenditures, it should be better protected against fiscal shocks 
than other expenditures that are easier to change. But this simple (political economy) argument 
overlooks the fact that the non-wage component of social expenditures is easy to postpone, not 
only because political considerations are less important in this case, but also because social 
expenditures are long-term investments with virtually no short-run welfare returns or costs. This 
cannot be said, for instance, of unfinished public infrastructure projects, where delays may carry 
both political costs and financial and operational losses. Non-wage budget cuts in the economic 
sectors (customs, industry regulation and support) or in the judiciary and the legislature may also 
carry heavier political costs than similar cuts in the social sectors because of the stronger clout 
and louder voice of the users of these services vis-à-vis the families and individuals who receive 
the education and health services from the public sector. While this hypothesis has to do with the 
relative (political and welfare) costs of budget cuts in the social sectors in the short run, a 
complementary hypothesis may help to understand why the social sectors may be also more 
vulnerable than other expenditures over longer time spans. From a fiscal point of view, social 
expenditures represent pure transfers with little or no direct or indirect effect on fiscal revenues   12
for long periods of time. Other expenditures may have larger revenue effects, especially if they 
boost growth by improving the efficiency of some government services or by directly supporting 
the private sector, and therefore may be better protected than social expenditures in the face of a 
debt shock that threatens fiscal sustainability. 
Before further elaborating on these basic findings, it is worth mentioning that the 
sensitivity of social expenditures to debt shocks is robust to the inclusion of other variables that 
might in principle affect social expenditures. All our regressions control for changes in log GDP 
and its squared (results not reported), which sometimes are significant, but excluding them from 
the regressions does not reduce the significance of the debt coefficient and barely changes any 
other result. We have also found that the results are unaltered by changes in inflation, the real 
exchange rate, the trade balance, imports or exports (results not shown). Furthermore, none of 
these variables is statistically significant. 
4. Some Extensions: By Sector, By Lender, and Defaults 
Table 6 replicates the basic regressions for the two main types of social expenditures: education 
and health. The results indicate that both types of expenditures react adversely to changes in the 
debt ratio. The coefficients in the regressions where the expenditures are measured as a share of 
GDP are highly significant and show little change when other fiscal variables are included as 
controls. When education and health are measured as shares of total expenditures, the 
coefficients are less stable, but are always negative and statistically significant at least at the 5 
percent level. With respect to the size of the debt coefficients, it is important to note that 
although those for education are larger than those for health in absolute values, the opposite is 
actually the case when the relative size of the sectors is taken into account.
11 Therefore, education 
expenditures are somewhat more shielded from the adverse effects of a debt shock. However, the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
Tables 7 and 8 provide a basis from which to discuss how, and if, the main conclusions of 
the previous section should be qualified considering the role of the official lenders, which 
include multilateral financial organizations, bilateral official lenders and the International 
Monetary Fund. The results of Table 7 indicate that total official debt has no additional effect on 
social expenditures. However, when separated by source, it becomes clear that different types of 
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official lending have different effects on social expenditure. Bilateral lending and IMF lending, 
for example, are supportive of social expenditure. The positive coefficients in both cases roughly 
counteract the negative coefficient of public debt in general. This contrasts markedly with the 
effect of other multilateral debt, which further reduces social expenditure. Notice, however, that 
the negative effect of multilateral lending is somewhat weakened (but remains significant at the 
10 percent level) when other fiscal variables are included in the regression. Notice also that when 
social expenditures are measured as shares of total revenues (not as shares of GDP), all types of 
official lending become insignificant. These results suggest that the different influence that each 
type of official lending has on social expenditures is due basically to how it influences total 
expenditures, rather than social expenditures directly. This is important to understand why non-
IMF multilateral lending reinforces the adverse effects of debt, while bilateral and IMF lending 
ameliorates them. 
Table 8 attempts to shed some light on this. Official lending, in general, is associated 
with higher fiscal revenues and a stronger primary balance (both weakly significant), but is 
especially associated with lower interest payments (significant at 5 percent) and with a stronger 
overall fiscal balance (significant at 1 percent).
12 Differentiating by source, it becomes clear that 
while bilateral lending tends to increase total primary expenditures (more than offsetting the 
negative effect of public lending in general), IMF lending produces no discernible effect, while 
other multilateral lending reinforces the negative effect that public debt has on total primary 
expenditures. However, IMF lending is the only type of official lending that is associated with 
improvements in the primary balance, consistent with the role of this institution as an overseer of 
macroeconomic and fiscal stability. Interestingly, however, IMF lending seems to lead to higher 
interest payments, while multilateral lending is associated with substantially lower interest 
payments (500 basis points). When all these sources of fiscal change are combined, it turns out 
that only bilateral debt is associated with improvements in the overall fiscal balance. A word of 
caution is called for, however, since these estimates may be biased by the endogeneity of official 
lending in general, and IMF lending in particular. For instance, endogeneity may be the reason 
why IMF lending seems to lead to higher interest payments. 
Table 9 deals with another thorny topic, namely the effects of debt default declarations on 
social expenditures. In the first two regressions, two new explanatory variables are added to the 
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basic specification: a dummy for default events, and the interaction between that dummy and the 
amount of debt outstanding.
13 Regression 1 indicates that, on average, the total effect of defaults 
on the amount of social expenditure is not statistically significant, but tends to rise significantly 
with the amount of all types of debt outstanding at the moment of the default. When the effects 
that defaults may have on primary expenditures and revenues are isolated, the impact on social 
expenditures is, on average, 0.4 percent of GDP and significant (Regression 2). This suggests 
that defaults do help reallocate expenditures in favor of the social sectors, a hypothesis that is 
confirmed by Regressions 5 and 6. Since we do not have information on the amounts of debt in 
default, we have run additional regressions separating the loans coming from official sources, 
since these very seldom are the subject of default. We find again that defaults on average have a 
positive effect on social expenditures in the range of 0.4-0.5 percent of GDP (Regressions 3 and 
4) and do contribute to reallocating expenditures towards the social sectors (Regressions 7 and 
8). These last two regressions also show that the share of social expenditures increases more 
significantly in defaulter countries that have more debt from official sources. Additional 
regressions by sector (not included in the table) indicate that the beneficial effect of defaults on 
social expenditures is somewhat concentrated in education.  
5. Is Latin America Different? 
Latin America is often associated with macroeconomic stability and debt crises. Since, as will be 
shown, social expenditures in Latin America are significantly below world patterns, it is worth 
discussing whether the links between debt and social expenditures are different in the region. 
As a percentage of GDP, social expenditures in Latin America are 1.7 percent below the 
world pattern among developing countries (Table 10, Regression 1). This gap is significant at a 1 
percent level, and is calculated after controlling for income per capita and its square (although 
these controls are not significant). As shown in Regression 7, this difference can be explained by 
the fact that the developing countries of East Asia, Europe and Central Asia, and Africa that are 
included in the sample spend significantly more than Latin America. The bulk of the social 
expenditure gap is in the education sector, where the gap is 1.2 percent points of GDP (and takes 
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into account the same groups of countries plus the Middle East and North Africa). However, 
when the analysis is based not on shares of GDP but on shares of total expenditure, social 
expenditure in Latin America turns out to be higher than world patterns. On average, Latin 
America devotes 6.2 percent more of the total (primary) budget to the social sectors than the rest 
of the developing world, and this difference is significant at the 5 percent level (Regression 4). 
Of the 6.2 percent points, 3.3 go to health while the remainder goes to education. (However, by 
regions, the difference is only significant with respect to the Middle East and North Africa; see 
Regression 10.) Therefore, if the region spends too little in the social sectors it is only because 
the sizes of the governments are below world patterns.  
Increases in debt stocks and in interest debt payments have much larger effects on social 
expenditures in Latin America than in the rest of the developing world, according to the results 
in Table 11. The first regression indicates that when debt stocks increase by $1, social 
expenditures in Latin America decline 2.9 cents more than in other regions (where the decline is 
1.1 cents). As indicated by Regression 2, the additional effect comes entirely from the increase in 
debt interest payments. For each additional dollar of debt payments, social expenditures in Latin 
America decline around 23 cents (while in the rest of the world they increase about 8 cents).
14 
This result suggests that interest rates in Latin America are higher and more sensitive to debt 
shocks than in the rest of the developing world. 
The higher sensitivity of social expenditures to interest payment shocks in Latin America 
is even more apparent when considering the share of social expenditures in total expenditures 
(Regressions 3 and 4 in Table 11). Social expenditures lose participation in a significant way 
when interest payments increase in Latin America (about 0.89 percent for each 1 percent 
increase in interest payments as a share of GDP). The share of the social sectors in total 
expenditure in Latin America is also significantly more sensitive to changes in primary 
expenditures.  
The last two columns of Table 11 replicate the two basic regressions for the Latin 
American countries only, using information on social expenditures produced by ECLAC. 
Although the limited sample restrains the use of this data set, the most important result is 
confirmed, namely, that social expenditures are sensitive to changes in public debt. The 
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coefficient in Regression 5 is highly significant and larger than that obtained in our previous 
estimates for our full sample, indicating that social expenditures in Latin America are more 
sensitive to debt shocks. Regression 6 suggests that this effect takes place mainly through the 
influence of debt on primary expenditures. The coefficient for this variable is highly significant 
and around three times as large as that estimated for the whole sample. 
Table 12 explores whether expenditures in education and health behave in different ways 
in Latin America. As we have seen, social expenditures are more sensitive to debt shocks in 
Latin America, mainly because they are more severely affected by increases in interest payments 
(which affect more social expenditures than other expenditures). While this conclusion holds for 
both social sectors, it affects health expenditures proportionately harder. This differential 
response is specific to debt-related variables, and does not hold for other fiscal variables (for 
instance, it does not apply to the response of social expenditures to total primary expenditures). 
The role of official debt is not entirely different in Latin America. The regressions for 
social expenditures as shares of GDP (Columns 1 through 4 in Table 13) indicate that Latin 
America behaves like other developing regions in this respect. A slightly different picture 
emerges when social expenditures are measured as shares of total primary expenditure. Taken 
together, all the official loans (multilateral, bilateral and loans from the IMF) to the region have 
an additional positive effect on social expenditures as a share of total expenditures, as shown in 
Regression 5 in Table 13. Paradoxically, this effect comes from bilateral, not multilateral, loans, 
as Regression 7 indicates.  
Finally, Table 14 assesses whether defaults are more or less beneficial to social 
expenditure in Latin America. Although the inclusion of so many controls needed to answer this 
question may be intimidating, the relevant ones are straightforward. Regressions 1 and 2, which 
do not differentiate by type of lending, indicate that the default-related variables are not different 
in Latin America. However, in Regression 3, which does differentiate by type of lender, the 
default dummy coefficient for the whole sample takes a negative (and weakly significant) value, 
but takes a positive and significant value for Latin America, suggesting that the positive 
(average) effect of defaults on the level of social expenditure presented in a previous section is 
due to the Latin American countries. In Regressions 2 and 4, which control for the components 
of the fiscal balance, the default dummy coefficients—both for the whole sample and for Latin 
America—become insignificant, while the coefficient of interest debt payments in Latin America   17
is negative and strongly significant, thus suggesting that the beneficial effect of defaults in the 
region is associated with the reallocation of funds previously destined to service the debt. 
However, as Regressions 5 thru 8 consistently indicate, while defaults on average tend to raise 
the share of social expenditures in primary expenditures in the developing countries, the opposite 
occurs in Latin America. The adverse effect of defaults on the share of social expenditures in 
Latin America only becomes positive at high debt-to-GDP ratios (of around 50-60 percent, 
according to Regressions 5 and 6). Therefore, defaults do seem to raise social expenditures in 
Latin America, as lower interest payments “crowd in” primary expenditures; at high debt levels 
this effect tends to favor social sectors vis-à-vis other sectors. 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
Although the effects of public indebtedness on social expenditures is an issue of concern for 
politicians, social activists and the public at large, economists have basically disregarded the 
issue without much discussion of whether the various claims fit the facts or not. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to address some of the most basic questions related to the issue: 
Do social expenditures rise or fall when public debt increases? Does the effect depend on how 
other fiscal variables react? Are education and health expenditures affected in the same way? 
Does official vs. multilateral lending make any difference? Are defaults good for social 
expenditures? In Latin America, where social expenditures are below world patterns and high 
indebtedness is a common feature, these are not academic questions. 
Our findings give credit to many of the widely held views about the deleterious effects of 
high indebtedness. Higher debt ratios do reduce social expenditures, and not just because of the 
extra cost in interest payments (an effect that is especially important in Latin America), but 
because they are associated with cuts in total expenditures that affect the social sectors. Debt 
displaces social expenditures mainly because it reduces the room (or the appetite) for further 
indebtedness. Multilateral lending is not a solution for that problem. On average in the 
developing world, loans by multilateral organizations have an additional adverse effect on social 
expenditures, probably because they impose further discipline on total expenditures. Also in line 
with popular wisdom, defaulting on debt obligations does help increase social expenditures on 
average in the developing world, and particularly so in Latin America, where lower debt interest 
payments “crowd in” all types of primary expenditures, including social ones.   18
Paradoxically as it may seem, these findings suggest that, at least in Latin America, 
orthodoxy in debt management is the best way to protect social expenditures. Consider the 
coefficients of Regression 3 in Table 3 and assume that the primary balance is at a level 
consistent with the stability of the debt ratio.
15 An improvement equivalent to 1 percent of GDP 
in the primary balance should initially cause a decline of social expenditures of 0.034 percent of 
GDP. However, this initial reduction is partially offset by an increase in social expenditures of 
0.014 percent of GDP the following year, because the stock of debt has fallen. In the third year, 
the initial reduction would be fully offset, and beginning with the following year social 
expenditures would rise above the initial level. But the coefficients of Regression 4 indicate that 
it is possible to have social expenditure rising from the outset if the fiscal adjustment is based on 
an increase in revenues rather than on a reduction of expenditures, which is the reason why 
social expenditures fall in periods of fiscal retrenchment.  
Our findings for the effects of defaults are also less supportive of heterodox actions than 
may seem at first sight. On average worldwide, social expenditures typically rise 0.4-0.5 percent 
of GDP the year after the declaration of a default (isolating the influence of lending from official 
sources). This is hardly a good business, since defaulters may end up paying a premium and 
facing much more restricted access to the credit markets, which may easily offset the beneficial 
effect. The conclusion is valid for Latin America also, because although the average effect is 
substantially larger (1.6 percent of GDP),
16 social expenditures in the region are much more 
sensitive to increases in debt interest payments. 
Thus, the main policy conclusion of this paper is that the best way to protect social 
expenditure is to avoid overindebtedness. 
                                                           
15 That is, approximately, pb = (g-r)*D where pb is the primary balance, g the rate of growth of the economy, r the 
real interest rate of the debt and D the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
16 That is the sum of the coefficients of the default dummy variables for the whole sample and for Latin America.   19
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable  Number of 
observations Mean  Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum
Social expenditure (share of GDP)  1729  0.06  0.03  0.00  0.34 
Education expenditure (share of GDP)  1769  0.04  0.02  0.00  0.20 
Health expenditure (share of GDP)  1765  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.13 
Social expenditure (share of primary expenditures)  803  0.29  0.10  0.05  0.78 
Education expenditure (share of primary expenditures) 812  0.19  0.07  0.04  0.42 
Health expenditure (share of primary expenditures)  829  0.10  0.06  0.01  0.37 
                 
Public debt (share of GDP)  1208  0.52  0.31  -0.02  1.50 
Public domestic debt (share of GDP)  966  0.22  0.18  0.00  1.08 
Public foreign debt (share of GDP)  953  0.37  0.31  0.00  1.49 
                 
Official debt (share of GDP)  2015  0.66  0.58  0.00  3.10 
Multilateral debt (share of GDP)  2120  0.35  0.35  0.00  1.50 
Bilateral debt (share of GDP)  2066  0.31  0.32  0.00  1.50 
IMF debt (share of GDP)  2244  0.03  0.08  0.00  1.39 
Default (Dummy)  2736  0.19  0.39  0.00  1.00 
                 
Fiscal balance (share of GDP)  1500  -0.03  0.05  -0.60  0.27 
Primary balance (share of GDP)  2014  -0.01  0.05  -0.53  0.24 
Debt service (share of GDP)  1184  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.27 
Primary expenditure (share of GDP)  1006  0.24  0.10  0.04  0.57 
Total Revenues (share of GDP)  1419  0.22  0.11  0.00  0.56 
                 
GDP pc (log)  2497  8.10  0.90  6.13  10.30 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Social expenditure (share of GDP)  1.000                                                             
Education expenditure (share of GDP)  0.900  1.000                                                          
Health expenditure (share of GDP)  0.760  0.402  1.000                                                       
Social expenditure (share of primary expenditures)  0.587  0.515  0.467  1.000                                                    
Education expenditure (share of primary expenditures)  0.518  0.618  0.167  0.908  1.000                                                 
Health expenditure (share of primary expenditures)  0.477  0.171  0.749  0.773  0.437  1.000                                              
Public debt (share of GDP)  -0.270 -0.266 -0.171 -0.156 -0.148 -0.111 1.000                                           
Public domestic debt (share of GDP)  -0.067 -0.042 -0.079 0.031  0.036  0.011  0.398  1.000                                        
Public foreign debt (share of GDP)  -0.234 -0.283 -0.071 -0.148 -0.186 -0.035 0.837  0.026  1.000                                     
Fiscal balance (share of GDP)  -0.104 -0.110 -0.053 0.245  0.234  0.171  0.034  -0.046 0.082  1.000                                  
Primary balance (share of GDP)  -0.052 -0.059 -0.022 0.186  0.163  0.152  0.103  0.099  0.076  0.598  1.000                               
Debt service (share of GDP)  0.009  0.006  0.009  -0.037 -0.046 -0.008 0.194  0.180  0.115  -0.286 0.054  1.000                            
Primary expenditure (share of GDP)  0.399  0.376  0.279  -0.338 -0.335 -0.219 -0.121 -0.034 -0.116 -0.557 -0.383  -0.017  1.000                         
Total Revenues (share of GDP)  0.245  0.200  0.217  -0.076 -0.098 -0.015 -0.029 -0.040 0.004  0.343  0.276  0.220  0.249  1.000                      
Official debt (share of GDP)  -0.124 -0.141 -0.051 -0.107 -0.115 -0.056 0.477  0.080  0.474  0.067  0.102  0.061  -0.071 -0.009 1.000                   
Multilateral debt (share of GDP)  -0.130 -0.155 -0.041 -0.108 -0.125 -0.044 0.315  0.060  0.312  0.018  0.040  -0.006  -0.036 -0.070 0.836  1.000                
Bilateral debt (share of GDP)  -0.087 -0.091 -0.047 -0.078 -0.077 -0.051 0.492  0.076  0.489  0.092  0.129  0.104  -0.082 0.047  0.879  0.473  1.000             
IMF debt (share of GDP)  -0.054 -0.065 -0.017 -0.116 -0.111 -0.081 0.239  0.125  0.196  -0.047 0.099  0.080  0.056  0.002  0.453  0.459  0.329  1.000          
Default (Dummy)  0.085  0.058  0.093  0.102  0.064  0.123  0.092  0.113  0.103  -0.060 0.050  0.074  -0.050 -0.045 -0.025 -0.082 0.030  -0.068 1.000      
GDP pc (log)  0.017  0.016  0.013  -0.017 -0.020 -0.007 -0.136 -0.039 -0.121 -0.104 -0.044  -0.082  0.104  -0.097 -0.290 -0.313 -0.194 -0.069 0.008 1.000   
GDP pc (square, log)  0.014  0.014  0.009  -0.017 -0.018 -0.009 -0.132 -0.043 -0.115 -0.102 -0.046  -0.084  0.096  -0.102 -0.278 -0.302 -0.185 -0.069 0.013 0.998 1.000






Table 3. Social Expenditures and Debt Stock 
     Dependent Variable: Social Expenditure (share of  GDP) 
  Arellano Bond
1  Independent Variables 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Social expenditure (share of GDP, lagged)    0.3721  0.3869  0.3823  0.2986  0.3565  0.2811 
     (6.4281)*** (6.7277)***(6.6605)***(5.5971)***(5.9447)*** (5.1818)***
Social expenditure (share of  primary expenditures, lagged)                
                      
Public debt (share of  GDP, lagged)    -0.0155  -0.0132  -0.0138  -0.0134       
     (3.8089)*** (3.4642)***(3.5154)***(3.4728)***      
Public domestic debt (share of  GDP, lagged)                -0.0105  -0.0164 
                 (1.2723)  (2.1013)**
Public foreign debt (share of  GDP, lagged)                -0.0127  -0.0099 
                 (2.7923)*** (2.3993)**
Fiscal balance (share of  GDP)       -0.0331             
        (2.3533)**            
Debt service (share of  GDP)          0.0490  0.0196     0.0134 
           (1.5952)  (0.6778)     (0.4868) 
Primary expenditure (share of  GDP)             0.1315     0.1255 
              (8.4764)***    (7.7754)***
Total Revenues (share of  GDP)             0.0417     0.0477 
              (2.5313)**    (2.8511)***
Primary balance (share of  GDP)          -0.0338          
           (2.5722)**         
Constant    0.0007  0.0006  0.0006  0.0007  0.0005  0.0007 
     (3.5067)*** (3.4919)***(3.3600)***(4.0877)***(2.7228)*** (4.1010)***
Observations    387  365  365  325  297  297 
Number of countries    57  53  53  50  46  46 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (chi2)    232.24  259.78  255.77  215.18  242.37  225.83 
Test of autocorrelation (z)    -1.17  -1.87  -1.99  -2.12  -1.33  -2.38 
R-squared                    
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses                    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2
.              
1 In all Arellano Bond estimations, the independent variables are in first differences.          
2 For OLS fixed effects all variables are in first differences and include a country dummy.        
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Table 4. Robustness of Basic Results 
     Social expenditure 
(share of GDP)    Social expenditure 
(share of GDP)   
Social expenditure 
(share of primary 
expenditures) 
  OLS Fixed Effects
2    Arellano Bond 
1    Arellano Bond 
1  Independent Variables 
  1  2    3  4    5  6 
Social expenditure (share of GDP, lagged)     -0.1396  -0.1064    0.5001  0.4008         
      (2.7433)***  (2.1722)**   (8.3567)*** (7.4628)***        
Social expenditure (share of GDP, second lag)             -0.0201  -0.0634         
              (0.4093)  (1.4243)         
Social expenditure (share of  primary expenditures, lagged)                     0.3345  0.3185 
                      (5.8154)*** (5.8739)***
Public debt (share of  GDP, lagged)     -0.0142  -0.0139    -0.0155  -0.0146    -0.0390  -0.0543 
      (3.4928)***  (3.5747)***   (3.5575)*** (3.6846)***   (2.2119)** (3.1247)***
Debt service (share of  GDP)        0.0243       0.0543       -0.0196 
         (0.6673)       (1.7811)*       (0.1789) 
Primary expenditure (share of  GDP)        0.0883       0.1108       -0.4371 
         (5.0012)***      (6.5703)***      (5.8065)***
Total Revenues (share of  GDP)        0.0172       0.0134       0.1043 
         (0.8918)       (0.7963)       (1.3580) 
Constant     -0.0078  -0.0069    0.0007  0.0008    0.0014  0.0013 
      (1.2728)  (1.1850)    (3.4595)*** (4.2454)***   (1.8399)*  (1.8717)* 
Observations     297  297    289  289    290  290 
Number of countries     46  46    46  46    44  44 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions (chi2)             158.08  168.21    188.47  183.14 
Test of autocorrelation (z)             -0.48  -0.30    -1.28  -1.41 
R-squared     0.2361  0.3194                
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses                     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                  
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2.          
1 In all Arellano Bond estimations, the independent variables are in first differences.          
2 For OLS fixed effects all variables are in first differences and include a country dummy.        
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Total revenues  
(share of  GDP)
Primary 
expenditures 
(share of  GDP)
Primary balance 
(share of  GDP)
Debt service 
(share of  GDP)
Fiscal balance 
(share of  GDP)
I n d e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e s 12345
Total revenues (share of  GDP, lagged) 0.375
(6.0518)***
Primary expenditures (share of  GDP, lagged) 0.435
(7.5643)***
Primary balance (share of  GDP, lagged) 0.310
(5.1193)***
Debt service (share of  GDP, lagged) 0.689
(14.1499)***
Fiscal balance (share of  GDP, lagged) 0.304
(4.8248)***
Public debt (share of  GDP, lagged) 0.026 -0.025 0.049 0.013 0.021
(1.8858)* (1.8370)* (2.6976)*** (1.7543)* (1.196)
Constant -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.8387) (0.9393) (0.0124) (3.0284)*** (0.9993)
Observations 288 288 282 282 282
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 4 34 34 34 34 3
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2.
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.




Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Education expenditure (share of  GDP, lagged) 0.3992 0.3505
(6.9493)*** (6.3722)***
Health expenditure (share of  GDP, lagged) 0.4614 0.3942
(6.9053)***(6.1444)***
Education expenditure (share of  primary expenditures, lagged) 0.3681 0.3318
(5.5502)*** (5.4580)***
Health expenditure (share of  primary expenditures, lagged) 0.3612 0.3249
(5.7038)*** (5.1714)***
Public debt (share of  GDP, lagged) -0.0107 -0.0108 -0.0080 -0.0078 -0.0318 -0.0424 -0.0212 -0.0309
(3.9162)*** (4.0380)*** (3.8878)***(3.8458)*** (2.5478)** (3.5468)*** (2.5025)** (3.6104)***
Debt service (share of  GDP) 0.0126 0.0078 -0.0404 0.0857
(0.7011) (0.5704) (0.5268) (1.5420)
Primary expenditure (share of  GDP) 0.0526 0.0321 -0.3685 -0.1633
(4.3333)*** (3.6836)*** (7.0075)*** (4.3626)***
Total Revenues (share of  GDP) 0.0123 0.0097 0.0216 0.0484
(0.9935) (1.0701) (0.3832) (1.2713)
Constant 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0011 0.0013 0.0007 0.0006
(3.1052)*** (3.7313)*** (2.5438)** (3.3014)*** (2.0260)** (2.5874)*** (1.7815)* (1.6762)*
Observations 282 282 282 282 282 282 282 282
Number of ifscode 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2.
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.
Table 6. Education Expenditure, Health Expenditure and Debt Stock
1
Education expenditure    
(share of  GDP)
Health expenditure 
(share of  GDP)
Education expenditure        
(share of  primary expenditures 
)
Health expenditure (share 
of  primary expenditures)
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Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Social expenditure (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.4625 0.3970 0.4579 0.3917
(7.8920)*** (7.3596)*** (7.9037)*** (7.3297)***
Social expenditure (share  of primary expenditures, lagged) 0.4511 0.4275 0.4536 0.4403
(7.0908)*** (7.1449)*** (6.9804)*** (7.1776)***
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0150 -0.0164 -0.0167 -0.0178 -0.0575 -0.0725 -0.0583 -0.0752
(3.3105)*** (3.8616)*** (3.7430)*** (4.2510)*** (2.8217)*** (3.5961)*** (2.8483)*** (3.7080)***
Official debt (share  of GDP, lagged)2 -0.0006 0.0014 0.0120 0.0056
(0.1241) (0.3079) (0.5751) (0.2717)
Multilateral debt (share  of GDP, lagged)2 -0.0198 -0.0164 -0.0045 -0.0437
(2.0104)** (1.7832)* (0.1002) -10,132
Bilateral debt (share  of GDP, lagged)2 0.0140 0.0159 0.0336 0.0465
(1.7808)* (2.1771)** (0.9202) (1.3113)
IMF debt (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.0219 0.0124 -0.0883 -0.0031
(0.7011) (0.4330) (0.6192) (0.0228)
Debt service (share  of GDP) 0.0329 0.0204 0.0110 0.0046
(1.2422) (0.7572) (0.0953) (0.0391)
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) 0.0839 0.0852 -0.4612 -0.4694
(4.4964)*** (4.6077)*** (5.2531)*** (5.2383)***
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) 0.0368 0.0343 0.0862 0.0777
(1.7583)* (1.6439) (0.8546) (0.7602)
Constant 0.0010 0.0009 0.0012 0.0011 0.0013 0.0018 0.0014 0.0021
(4.4389)*** (4.4187)*** (5.2000)*** (5.1422)*** (1.2622) (1.8040)* (1.2715) (1.9887)**
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244
Number of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.
2 Official debt is the sum of multilateral, bilateral and IMF debt. Multilateral and bilateral include concessionary and non-concessionary debt.
Table 7. Social Expenditure and Debt Stock by Lender
1
Social expenditure (share  of GDP) Social expenditure (share  of primary expenditures)  28
 
 
Total revenues  
(share  of GDP)
Primary 
expenditures 
(share  of GDP)
Primary balance 
(share  of GDP)
Debt service 
(share  of GDP)
Fiscal balance  
(share  of GDP)
Total revenues  
(share  of GDP)
Primary 
expenditures 
(share  of GDP)
Primary balance 
(share  of GDP)
Debt service 
(share  of GDP)
I n d e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e s 12345 6789
Total revenues (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.359 0.353
(5.6298)*** (5.4697)***
Primary expenditures (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.417 0.386
(7.3180)*** (6.6549)***
Primary balance (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.276 0.277
(4.4797)*** (4.4706)***
Debt service (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.691 0.702
(13.5155)*** (13.6693)***
Fiscal balance (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.330
(5.2529)***
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.010 -0.038 0.023 0.017 0.003 -0.013 -0.040 0.031 0.015
(0.6911) (2.5608)** (1.2364) (2.0587)** (0.1650) (0.9430) (2.7002)*** (1.6287) (1.7462)*
Official debt (share  of GDP, lagged)2 0.027 0.001 0.037 -0.018 0.055
(1.7616)* (0.0851) (1.9190)* (2.0473)** (2.8850)***
Multilateral debt (share  of GDP, lagged)2 0.007 -0.058 0.045 -0.050
(0.2252) (1.7918)* (1.1256) (2.8806)***
Bilateral debt (share  of GDP, lagged)2 0.049 0.053 -0.005 -0.000
(1.8320)* (2.0520)** (0.1387) (0.0084)
IMF debt (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.016 -0.084 0.277 0.097
(0.1561) (0.7841) (1.9023)* (1.7246)*
Constant 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.002
(1.8845)* (0.5273) (0.2731) (3.6593)*** (0.7342) (2.0258)** (1.3553) (0.0107) (3.7511)***
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 4 04 04 04 04 0 4 04 04 04 0
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2 
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.
2 Official debt is the sum of multilateral, bilateral and IMF debt. Multilateral and bilateral include concessionary and non-concessionary debt.












Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Social expenditure (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.3763 0.3149 0.4562 0.3689
(6.4570)***(5.8006)***(7.4275)***(6.7356)***
Social expenditure (share  of primary expenditures, lagged) 0.2502 0.2279 0.2367 0.2203
(4.4939)***(4.3518)***(4.2068)***(4.1540)***
Public debt (share of GDP, lagged) -0.0214 -0.0169 -0.0182 -0.0189 -0.032 -0.0598 -0.023 -0.0461
(4.4233)***(3.9112)***(3.7833)***(4.2497)*** (1.5758) (2.9897)*** (1.0570) (2.1750)**
Official public debt (share of GDP, lagged) -0.0076 -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.0174
(1.7754)* (0.7009) (0.0591) (1.0043)
Debt service (share of GDP) 0.0173 0.0185 -0.0282 -0.0072
(0.5907) (0.6512) (0.2354) (0.0589)
Primary expenditure (share of GDP) 0.1348 0.1028 -0.5421 -0.5467
(8.6293)*** (6.4404)*** (6.7613)*** (6.7642)***
Total Revenues (share of GDP) 0.0451 0.0428 0.0999 0.1202
(2.7253)*** (2.3641)** (1.1601) (1.3807)
Default (Dummy) 0.0008 0.004 0.0038 0.0051 0.0226 0.0172 0.0274 0.0213
(0.4057) (2.2044)** (1.9770)** (2.9232)*** (2.6856)*** (2.0679)** (3.1560)*** (2.4997)**
Default*Public debt 0.0111 0.0055 0.0064 0.0043 0.0044 0.0183 -0.0306 -0.0132
(2.1561)** (1.1423) (1.0150) (0.7574) (0.1874) (0.8192) (1.0662) (0.4907)
Default*Official public debt 0.0022 0.0039 0.0331 0.0307
-0.6197 -1.2162 (2.1364)** (2.0901)**
Constant 0.0007 0.0008 0.0012 0.0012 0.0035 0.0042 0.0032 0.0039
(3.8432)***(4.7394)***(5.3989)***(5.5280)*** (3.3674)***(4.1278)***(3.0271)***(3.7296)***
Observations 387 325 286 286 275 275 275 275
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 5 75 04 74 7 4 54 54 54 5
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.
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Table 10. Latin America Stylized Facts  (see note below) 
     
Social 
Expenditure 
(share  of GDP) 
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(share of primary 
expenditures) 
Independent Variables     1  2  3    4  5  6     7  8  9    10  11  12 
GDP pc (log)     -0.025  0.021  -0.045    0.173  0.271  -0.097     -0.027  0.03  -0.057    0.146  0.284  -0.138 
      (0.4890)  (0.6346)  (1.6239)    (0.8219)  (2.0184)**  (0.8333)     (0.4907)  (0.8704)  (2.0274)**    (0.6419)  (1.9354)*  (1.1556) 
GDP pc (square, log)     0.003  -0.001  0.003    -0.009  -0.017  0.008     0.003  -0.001  0.004    -0.008  -0.017  0.01 
      (0.8013)  (0.4489)  (1.9775)*    (0.7116)  (2.0352)**  -1.0514     (0.7958)  (0.6447)  (2.3477)**    (0.5396)  (1.9252)*  -1.3378 
East Asia and Pacific  (Dummy)                            0.02  0.017  0.003    -0.032  0.002  -0.034 
                             (2.0135)**  (2.7598)***  (0.5560)    (0.7812)  (0.0745)  (1.5784) 
Europe and Central Asia  (Dummy)                            0.02  0.008  0.011    -0.035  -0.03  -0.005 
                             (2.7417)***  (1.8632)*  (3.0802)***    (1.1768)  (1.5856)  (0.2921) 
Middle East & North Africa (Dummy)                            0.007  0.013  -0.006    -0.114  -0.04  -0.075 
                             (0.7401)  (2.2562)**  -1.3183    (3.1204)***  (1.6864)*  (3.8674)*** 
South Asia  (Dummy)                            0.001  0.001  0.000    -0.056  -0.028  -0.028 
                             (0.0439)  (0.0806)  (0.0130)    (0.7843)  (0.6161)  (0.7360) 
Africa (Dummy)                            0.019  0.018  0.001    -0.055  -0.011  -0.044 
                             (2.1605)**  (3.2262)***  -0.2717    (1.5368)  (0.4593)  (2.3607)** 
Latin America (Dummy)     -0.017  -0.012  -0.005    0.062  0.029  0.033                        
      (2.7853)***  (3.0829)***  (1.5045)    (2.4249)**  (1.7661)*  (2.3454)**                        
Constant     0.101  -0.064  0.165    -0.52  -0.895  0.375     0.09  -0.124  0.214    -0.359  -0.951  0.592 
      (0.4917)  (0.4924)  (1.4644)    (0.6146)  (1.6630)  (0.7994)     (0.3997)  (0.8763)  (1.8565)*    (0.3871)  (1.5907)  -1.2172 
Observations     770  770  770    770  770  770     770  770  770    770  770  770 
Number of countries     83  83  83    83  83  83     83  83  83    83  83  83 
R-squared     0.29  0.17  0.34    0.16  0.10  0.25     0.31  0.22  0.45    0.20  0.12  0.36 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses                                       
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1%                                     
Note:                                            
Between estimators                                            
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Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
Social expenditure (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.3540 0.2515 0.4057 -0.0140
(6.1239)***(4.6480)*** (4.4787)*** (0.1079)
Social expenditure (share  of primary expenditures, lagged) 0.2499 0.1794
(4.4945)*** (3.3975)***
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0109 -0.0137 -0.0280 -0.0499
(2.4672)** (3.4030)*** (1.4730) (2.7447)***
Debt service (share  of GDP) 0.0851 0.2104
(2.6224)*** (1.5953)
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) 0.1294 -0.4213
(8.1281)*** (5.6564)***
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) 0.0310 0.0345
(1.7814)* (0.4338)
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0286 0.0024 0.0325 0.0180 -0.0290 -0.0243
(2.6018)*** (0.2057) (0.6201) (0.3340) (4.3990)*** (1.3287)
Debt service (share  of GDP) -0.3105 -0.8930 0.0233
(4.1523)*** (2.9948)*** (0.1792)
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) -0.0084 -0.7699 0.3541
(0.1486) (3.1985)*** (3.4722)***
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) -0.0042 0.1665 0.0199
(0.0817) (0.7182) (0.2156)
Constant 0.0007 0.0005 0.0024 0.0026 0.0018 0.0021
(3.7053)***(2.8330)*** (3.0145)*** (3.1764)*** (4.4191)*** (2.7687)***
Observations 387 325 314 314 159 99
Number of countries 57 50 48 48 15 13
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.
2 Estimations based on ECLAC database of social expenditure.
Social expenditure 
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Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Education expenditure (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.3884 0.3347
(6.5560)***(6.2374)***
Health expenditure (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.4126 0.2879
(5.6737)***(4.0396)***
Education expenditure (share  of primary expenditures, lagged) 0.1981 0.1574
(3.4153)*** (2.8690)***
Health expenditure (share  of primary expenditures, lagged) 0.3062 0.1981
(4.6930)*** (3.1070)***
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0111 -0.0108 -0.0045 -0.0049 -0.0161 -0.0339 -0.0119 -0.0246
(3.5930)***(3.7149)*** (2.1320)** (2.4781)** (1.2274) (2.6135)*** (1.3472) (2.8481)***
Debt service (share  of GDP) 0.0372 0.0469 -0.0110 0.2541
(1.6611)* (2.9340)*** (0.1192) (3.7718)***
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) 0.0828 0.0343 -0.3478 -0.1571
(6.2793)*** (3.9001)*** (6.0275)*** (4.0700)***
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) 0.0112 0.0064 0.0038 0.0405
(0.7618) (0.6354) (0.0596) (0.9273)
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.0075 0.0173 -0.0133 -0.0015 0.0347 0.0133 -0.0055 -0.0025
(0.8378) (1.9197)* (2.3332)** (0.2643) (0.9354) (0.3339) (0.2344) (0.0989)
Debt service (share  of GDP) -0.1309 -0.1319 -0.3788 -0.4368
(2.6482)*** (3.8618)*** (1.8278)* (3.1330)***
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) -0.0503 0.0214 -0.5546 -0.1875
(1.1892) (0.7614) (2.9787)*** (1.6474)*
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) 0.0182 0.0128 0.1923 0.0007
(0.4353) (0.4664) (1.0262) (0.0055)
Constant 0.0008 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 0.0017 0.0030 0.0005 0.0003
(5.4104)***(4.1113)*** (1.8917)* (1.2881) (2.4731)** (3.8784)*** (1.1586) (0.5587)
Observations 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.
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I n d e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e s 1 2 3 4 5678
Social expenditure (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.4543 0.3507 0.4666 0.3520
(7.6198)*** (6.1649)*** (7.8463)***(6.1937)***
Social expenditure (share  of primary expenditures, lagged) 0.4393 0.3419 0.4382 0.3525
(6.9708)*** (5.6531)*** (6.7745)*** (5.5994)***
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0134 -0.0187 -0.0155 -0.0198 -0.0567 -0.0722 -0.0513 -0.0693
(2.7981)*** (4.2319)*** (3.1934)***(4.4565)*** (2.6084)*** (3.4572)*** (2.3348)** (3.2607)***
Official debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0023 0.0015 -0.0042 0.0002
(0.4485) (0.3301) (0.1893) (0.0084)
Multilateral debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0230 -0.0132 -0.0074 -0.0256
(2.1453)** (1.3466) (0.1608) (0.5757)
Bilateral debt (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.0123 0.0131 -0.0115 0.0089
(1.3764) (1.6121) (0.2939) (0.2377)
IMF debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.1228 -0.1740 -0.8918 -0.9208
(0.9729) (1.4114) (1.6136) (1.6516)*
Debt service (share  of GDP) 0.0803 0.0748 0.2279 0.2135
(2.6523)*** (2.4202)** (1.6813)* (1.5178)
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) 0.0863 0.0867 -0.4039 -0.4257
(4.4521)*** (4.4814)*** (4.5736)*** (4.6695)***
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) 0.0356 0.0313 0.1287 0.1204
(1.5529) (1.3562) (1.1865) (1.0976)
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0111 0.0124 -0.0041 0.0359 0.0281 0.0353 0.0685 0.0451
(0.8941) (0.9970) (0.3037) (2.3976)** (0.4912) (0.5916) (1.1057) (0.6337)
Official debt (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.0156 0.0075 0.1353 -0.0267
(0.9312) (0.4355) (2.0296)** (0.3817)
Multilateral debt (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.0349 0.0048 0.1049 0.1538
(0.9337) (0.1333) (0.5904) (0.8895)
Bilateral debt (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.0098 0.0460 0.2494 0.0005
(0.3839) (1.6348) (2.4963)** (0.0048)
IMF debt (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.0363 0.0153 -0.0013 0.0627
(1.0248) (0.4861) (0.0084) (0.4212)
Debt service (share  of GDP) -0.2290 -0.2493 -0.9562 -0.8910
(2.9511)*** (3.2351)*** (2.9601)*** (2.7172)***
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) -0.0229 0.0726 -0.6386 -0.4866
(0.3467) (0.9453) (2.2954)** (1.4909)
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) -0.0497 -0.0530 -0.3688 -0.4686
(0.8641) (0.8740) (1.3443) (1.6079)
Constant 0.0010 0.0008 0.0012 0.0009 0.0019 0.0011 0.0017 0.0009
(4.5315)*** (3.4362)*** (5.0427)***(3.7576)*** (1.8021)* (0.9947) (1.6048) (0.7868)
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 4 04 04 04 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.
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Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Social expenditure (share  of GDP, lagged) 0.352 0.2454 0.4394 0.3425
(5.8897)*** (4.4150)*** (7.0793)*** (5.9507)***
Social expenditure (share  of primary expenditures, lagged) 0.1857 0.1477 0.1897 0.1494
(3.2542)*** (2.7414)*** (3.3166)*** (2.7545)***
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0158 -0.0164 -0.0195 -0.021 -0.0108 -0.0411 -0.0205 -0.0456
(2.9211)*** (3.5079)*** (3.8073)*** (4.4486)*** (0.4883) (1.9069)* (0.8706) (1.9935)**
Official public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0122 -0.0042 0.0227 0.0033
(2.4569)** (0.9260) (1.0208) (0.1535)
Debt service (share  of GDP) 0.0799 0.0683 0.1586 0.2001
(2.4795)** (2.1669)** (1.2089) (1.4836)
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) 0.132 0.1002 -0.475 -0.477
(8.3598)*** (6.0943)*** (5.8704)*** (5.7920)***
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) 0.0361 0.024 0.1047 0.087
(2.0767)** (1.2234) (1.1171) (0.9153)
Default (Dummy) 0.001 0.0035 -0.0118 -0.0032 0.0531 0.0475 0.0724 0.0534
(0.3706) (0.7652) (1.8939)* (0.5557) (2.5943)*** (2.4225)** (2.6893)*** (2.0520)**
Default*Public debt 0.0083 0.0043 0.0207 0.0137 -0.0666 -0.049 -0.0698 -0.0422
(1.4345) (0.5483) (2.4984)** (1.8194)* (1.8635)* (1.4389) (1.9012)* (1.1981)
Default*No official public debt 0.0101 0.0045 -0.0261 -0.0153
(1.6977)* (0.8433) (1.0130) (0.6293)
Public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0267 -0.0019 -0.0008 0.0174 -0.0659 -0.0335 -0.0161 -0.0132
(2.2995)** (0.1485) (0.0671) (1.4359) (1.1624) (0.5786) (0.2800) (0.2223)
No official public debt (share  of GDP, lagged) -0.0121 -0.0161 -0.0972 -0.1472
(0.6696) (0.9160) (1.3866) (2.1229)**
Debt service (share  of GDP) -0.3063 -0.214 -0.7517 -0.8198
(4.0948)*** (2.7171)*** (2.5431)** (2.4333)**
Primary expenditure (share  of GDP) 0.0268 0.0772 -0.4505 -0.5484
(0.4711) (1.2389) (1.7056)* (1.9369)*
Total Revenues (share  of GDP) -0.0385 0.0611 0.0027 0.134
(0.7373) (1.1037) (0.0103) (0.5049)
Default (Dummy) -0.0015 -0.0025 0.0277 0.0129 -0.1241 -0.1031 -0.144 -0.1087
(0.2041) (0.2831) (2.2557)** (1.1391) (3.0842)*** (2.6967)*** (2.7016)*** (2.1185)**
Default*Public debt 0.0049 0.0137 -0.0221 -0.016 0.2405 0.1786 0.1153 0.1239
(0.3173) (0.9616) (1.3298) (1.0602) (3.5514)*** (2.8230)*** (1.4896) (1.7291)*
Default*official public debt 0.0051 0.0173 0.1223 0.0697
(0.5598) (1.9879)** (3.1858)*** (1.8473)*
Constant 0.0008 0.0007 0.0013 0.0011 0.0034 0.0035 0.0037 0.0038
(4.0164)*** (3.6707)*** (5.7076)*** (4.7981)*** (3.3270)*** (3.2489)*** (3.4784)*** (3.3692)***
Observations 387 325 286 286 275 275 275 275
Number of countries 57 50 47 47 45 45 45 45
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5% ; *** significant at 1% 
Notes: All regressions include as controls GDP pc and (GDP pc)
2
1 All estimations are Arellano Bond in first differences.
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East Asia and 
Pacific
Europe and Central 
Asia 
Latin America
Middle East & North 
Africa
Africa South Asia 
China Albania Argentina Algeria Angola Bangladesh
Fiji Armenia Bahamas Bahrain Benin Bhutan
Indonesia Azerbaijan Barbados Egypt Botswana India
Kiribati Belarus Belize Iran Burkina Faso Maldives
Korea Bosnia & Herzegovina Bolivia Jordan Burundi Nepal
Laos Bulgaria Brazil Kuwait Cameroon Sri lanka
Malaysia Croatia Chile Lebanon Cape Verde
Mongolia Cyprus Colombia Libya Central African Rep.
Myanmar Czech Republic CostaRica Morocco Chad
Papua N.G. Estonia Dominica Oman Comoros
Philippines Georgia Dominican Republic Qatar Congo
Samoa Hungary Ecuador Saudi Arabia Congo
Solomon Isl.  Kazakhstan El Salvador Syrian Arab Republic Cote d'Ivoire
Thailand Kyrgyz Republic Grenada Tunisia Djibouti
Tonga Latvia Guatemala United Arab Emirates Equatorial Guinea
Vanuatu Lithuania Guyana Yemen Eritrea
Vietnam Macedonia Honduras Ethiopia
Moldova Jamaica Gabon
Poland Mexico Gambia
Romania Netherlands Antilles Ghana
Russia Nicaragua Guinea
Slovak Republic Panama Guinea-Bissau
Tajikistan Paraguay Kenya
Turkey Peru Lesotho
Turkmenistan St. Kitts and Nevis Liberia
Ukraine St. Lucia Madagascar
Uzbekistan St. Vincent & Grens. Malawi
Suriname Mali







Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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